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Abstrakt (Norwegian) 
Å overleve i skredfarlig terreng handler om å være på rett plass til rett tid, altså ta 
gode avgjørelser i forhold til skredfaren. Psykologisk forskning har vist at følelser 
som frykt og trygghet (fravær av frykt) er med på å gi valgene våre retning. 
Opplevelsen av trygghet antas derfor å være en viktig del av den menneskelige 
faktoren i snøskredulykker. Få studier har undersøkt skikjørernes egen opplevelse av 
sikkerhet. Dette studiet tok sikte på å utvikle et instrument for å måle opplevd 
sikkerhet hos skikjørere som kjører utenfor løypene (off-piste & backcountry). 
Basert på fokusgruppeintervju med skikjørere ble det utviklet et spørreskjema som 
ble distribuert elektronisk til skikjørere i hele Norge. Ved hjelp av faktoranalyse av 
resultatene ble faktorene Perceived Exposure, Collective Safety, Safe Objects, 
Knowledge & Skills og Experience identifisert og tilfredsstillende psykometriske 
egenskaper påvist. Funnene blir diskutert i lys av kunnskap tilegnet gjennom 
fokusgrupper og en gjennomgang av relevant litteratur. 
Keywords: perceived safety, human factor, avalanche risk, off-piste skiing, 
backcountry skiing, risk-taking, heuristics. 
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Abstract 
Survival in avalanche terrain is about being in the right place at the right time, i.e. 
taking the right decisions regarding avalanche danger. Psychological research has 
shown that emotions like fear and safety (absence of fear) influence our decisions. 
Perceived safety might therefore be an important part of the human factor in 
avalanche accidents. Few studies have examined perceived safety from a skier`s 
perspective. The aim of this study was to develop a scale for assessing perceived 
safety among off-piste and backcountry skiers. Based on focus group interviews with 
skiers, a survey was developed and distributed thru the internet to Norwegian skiers. 
Factor analysis of the results yielde the factors Perceived Exposure, Collective 
Safety, Safe Objects, Knowledge & Skills and Experience, all with satisfactory 
psychometric properties. Findings are discussed in the light of knowledge gained 
from the focus groups and from a literature review.  
Keywords: perceived safety, human factor, avalanche danger, off-piste skiing, 
backcountry skiing, risk-taking, heuristics. 
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Preface 
The idea of investigating perceived safety as a topic was first introduced at 
the University of Ulm in Germany by Professor Franz Porzsolt and his colleagues 
(Vangberg, 2008). By first looking closer at perceived safety in contexts as hospitals, 
schools and nursing homes, the idea grew in popularity and further included a great 
variety of areas like pharmacology, economy and engineering.  
 This study resulted from the author`s interest in issues on avalanche safety 
and the supervisors` experience and knowledge from an previous study on perceived 
safety (Vangberg, 2008). The combination resulted in this study on perceived safety 
among off-piste and backcountry skiers. 
This study has been a joint venture between the student and his supervisors. 
The student collected the data and most of the literature, while the statistical analysis 
was done with some guidance from the supervisors. The entire study has been a close 
cooperation between the supervisors and the student with a reciprocal exchange of 
ideas. 
This research study has created interest in local and national media, with 
interviews in papers, on radio and television. Authorities in the national snow science 
community have praised the initiative and called for a presentation of the study at the 
International Snow Science Workshop in Anchorage, Alaska in autumn 2012. Both 
focus group participants and survey respondents have expressed their enthusiasm for 
the study, finding participation as both interesting and worthwhile as a process of 
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Perceived safety among off-piste & backcountry skiers 
“The literature and basic research shows avalanche accidents are not a terrain, 
weather, or snowpack problem; avalanche accidents are a human problem.” (Atkins, 
2000, p. 47) 
Since 1972, more than two hundred people have been killed in avalanche 
accidents in Norway while pursuing backcountry recreational activities, i.e. more 
than five each year (NGI, 2001). Recently, the number of victims has further 
increased, with nine fatalities in 2009/2010 and ten in 2010/2011. So far in the winter 
season of 2012, avalanche accidents have already taken seven lives in Norway. 
According to Landrø (2002) several avalanche accidents during the last 
couple of years have revealed a new type of behavior in the Norwegian mountains: 
ski and snowboarders who consciously seek adventure in steep snow-covered 
mountainsides. Accidents become inevitable for two reasons: first, avalanche hazards 
are impossible to predict with a hundred percent certainty, and second, avalanches 
can occur in any snow-covered slope that is steep enough (Landrø, 2002). Off-piste 
and backcountry skiers will therefore always be exposed to the risk of avalanches.  
In 93 % of avalanche accidents, the victim or someone in his party triggered 
the avalanche (Tremper, 2008), a fact that highlights the human factors in avalanche 
accidents. Human factors can be defined as “the individual, team, client, 
organizational, and socio-political influences inherent in avalanche-related judgment 
and decision making” (Adams, 2005, p. 18). 
In terms of avalanche danger, skiers and snowboarders can be regarded as 
one group, conducting two different types of travel: off-piste and backcountry skiing. 
Off-piste skiing is downhill skiing or snowboarding on unprepared and uncontrolled 
slopes outside, but close to ski areas, and access is primarily obtained by means of 
ski lifts and possibly short hikes to reach the top of the run (Haegeli, Falk, Brugger, 
Etter, & Boyd, 2011). In comparison, backcountry skiing is downhill skiing or 
snowboarding on unprepared and uncontrolled slopes away from ski areas where 
skiers or snowboarders reach slopes by their own power using climbing skins or 
snowshoes. Backcountry skiing by motorized vehicles (e.g. snowmobile or 
helicopter) are under strict regulation in Norway and therefore not common. For 
practical reasons, the type of skier and the activity of skiing will also include 
snowboarders and the activity of snowboarding in the present study. 
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Previous work  
Human factors in avalanche accidents have been explored from a variety of 
perspectives, all trying to answer the overall question: “why do we get caught”? 
Observations of human error have made judgment and decision-making seen as the 
key to understand why we voluntarily put ourselves in danger of "the white death". 
Some themes covered are heuristic traps in recreational avalanche accidents 
(McCammon, 2004), amateur decision-making in avalanche terrain (Furman, 
Shooter, & Schumann, 2010; Haegeli, Haider, Longland, & Beardmore, 2010; 
McCammon & Haegeli, 2007), group dynamics and decision making (Bright, 2010), 
expert decision making (Adams, 2005; Stewart-Patterson, 2008) and risk perception 
(Eitzinger & Wiedemann, 2007). This study offers a new and promising perspective 
on human factors in avalanche accidents: perceived safety.  
Why focus on perceived safety? 
“Practically everything looks less important than safety” 
(Maslow, 1943, p. 376). 
Abraham Maslow proposed a need theory of motivation stating the feeling of 
safety as essential to all human beings (Maslow, 1943). Based on the assumption that 
people are driven by different needs, Maslow arranged these needs into a hierarchy 
and suggested that basic biological needs had to be fulfilled before moving on to the 
next step towards self-actualization. Maslow’s theory emphasizes the importance of 
safety, or at least the feeling of being safe (subjectively or objectively). 
The human belief system of maximal avoidance of environmental risk was 
severely shaken when the “unsinkable” Titanic sunk in 1912 (Porzsolt, Killian, & 
Eisemann, 2007). As a catastrophe of modern times, this accident illustrates, more 
than any other, that there may be a tremendous difference between subjective and 
objective safety (Porzsolt et al., 2007). Three important types of information are 
provided by the Titanic- incident according to Vangberg (2008):  
Firstly, the subjective (perceived) safety not necessarily has to be in 
agreement with the objective (real) safety. Secondly, the example illustrates 
that the decisions we make will depend on subjective (perceived) rather than 
objective safety. Thirdly, subjective safety can influence objective safety. In 
the Titanic example the crew decided to take the more dangerous but faster 
polar route because they felt safe enough to accept this risk. This makes it 
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clear that the perceived safety is an indispensible determinant of human 
behavior that may induce both well-being and harm. (Vangberg, 2008, p. 18)  
Since the avalanche danger never can be fully predicted, recreationists may 
perceive off-piste and backcountry skiing as safe, even when it in reality is not. 
Experiences without negative consequences in face of avalanche danger may fuel 
this impression, even if it was a coincidence that an avalanche was not triggered. 
Jumping with a parachute from an airplane describes an opposite situation, where the 
real safety is high, but the perceived safety is low (Porzsolt et al., 2007). Differences 
in safety measures between these two activities may highlight this paradox.  
In applying Maslow´s hierarchy of needs (Maslow, 1943) to off-piste and 
backcountry skiers we can assume that fulfilling the basic physiological needs of 
food and sleep have to be achieved in order to be able to focus on safety. Safety in 
skiers’ immediate environment may be determined by several factors, one of them 
being how they perceive their own safety. Skiers might perceive safety upon what 
they know about avalanches, their travelling skills, previous experience, trust in 
others or in their equipment, their group, and perceived exposure. Obviously, feeling 
safe is a prerequisite for recreational activities like skiing.  
The relationship between safety and risk 
Safety and risk are linked together both conceptually and pragmatically 
(Hollnagel, 2008). The conceptual link becomes obvious when comparing the 
definitions of the two concepts. Risk is often defined as the likelihood that something 
unwanted might happen. Safety on the other hand is defined as the absence of 
unwanted events, like risks. This reciprocity is reflected in the fact that safety, or 
lack of it, usually is measured by the number of unwanted events like accidents or 
incidents. A high level of safety is therefore equivalent to a lower occurrence of such 
events and therefore to a lower level of risk.  
Until recently, our understanding of safety has been limited to the technical, 
real, i.e. objective safety since this has been the only measurable aspect of safety 
(Vangberg, 2008). Porzsolt, Polianski, Görgen, & Eisemann (2011) regard 
safety/security and risks as related topics, but belonging to different systems. By 
being located on a subjective and individual level closely linked to psychological 
systems, safety and security are different from risk. While risk can be measured and 
expressed in probabilities, safety and security cannot. A focus on perceived safety 
counters this challenge by focusing on the perceived and subjective experience of 
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safety. With the use of psychometric instruments, the dimensions that influence 
perceived safety can be identified, and the degree of perceived safety can be 
quantified (Porzsolt et al., 2011). 
  Modern humans strive for avoiding risk on an individual basis by means of 
modern technology (Porzsolt et al., 2007). Examples from a skier´s perspective are 
high-tech avalanche airbags that reduce the likelihood of burial, rescue equipment 
like an avalanche beacon that speeds up the rescue process and highly advanced 
medical equipment like heart-starters that seemingly can reanimate people. As a 
consequence, people might have developed a more or less blind trust in these 
technological solutions, based on an illusion of control.  
The concept of safety consists according to Porzsolt et al. (2007) of two 
constructs: the real (objective) safety and the perceived (subjective) safety. To fully 
understand the concept of safety, one has to look at these two components equally, 
taking into consideration that both aspects of safety constitute the basis of how we 
direct our behavior and make our decisions.  
Perceived safety and affect 
Perceived safety is directly influenced by affect thru the feeling of safety or 
the absence of fear. Affect has over the years been given a central role in dual-
process theories of thinking, knowing, and information processing (Slovic, Finucane, 
Peters, & MacGregor, 2007). Dual-processes theories assume that people apprehend 
reality in two fundamentally different ways. These two processes are variously 
labeled intuitive, automatic, natural, nonverbal, narrative, and experiential, and the 
other analytical, deliberative, verbal, and rational (Epstein, 1994). One of the 
characteristics of the former, the experiential system is according to Slovic et al. 
(2007) its affective basis. Denoting analysis as important in some decision-making 
circumstances, they argue that reliance on affect and emotion is a quicker, easier, and 
more efficient way to navigate in a complex, uncertain, and sometimes dangerous 
world.  
Epstein (1994) gives affect a direct and primary role in motivating behavior:  
The experiential system is assumed to be intimately associated with the 
experience of affect, . . . which refer[s] to subtle feelings of which people are 
often unaware. When a person responds to an emotionally significant event . . 
. the experiential system automatically searches its memory banks for related 
events, including their emotional accompaniment. . . If the activated feelings 
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are pleasant, they motivate actions and thoughts anticipated to reproduce the 
feelings. If the feelings are unpleasant, they motivate actions and thoughts 
anticipated to avoid the feelings (Epstein, 1994, p. 716). 
Perceived safety might be one of these subtle feelings motivating behavior. 
For the skier the additional safety felt by wearing an avalanche airbag or by skiing 
with someone one trusts might be the sole factor deciding if one is to ski a particular 
slope or not. Old tracks or familiar terrain might also create the same feelings of 
safety, guiding us towards potential danger. In off-piste skiing the experiential 
system is kept busy by a ski lift, continuously putting us in new situations demanding 
rapid decisions regarding the avalanche danger. Backcountry skiing has in contrast 
the advantage of time to make good decisions on our way up, at least if one travels 
non-mechanically. 
The somatic marker hypothesis. A well-known account of the role of affect 
in decision making is presented by the neurologist, Antonio Damasio (1994), in his 
book Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain. Seeking to 
determine what in the brain allowed humans to behave rationally, Damasio (1994) 
argued that thought is made largely from images, broadly construed to include 
sounds, smells, real or imagined visual impressions, ideas, and words. Through a 
lifetime history of learning these images become ‘‘marked’’ by positive and negative 
feelings linked directly or indirectly to somatic or bodily states: ‘‘In short, somatic 
markers are . . . feelings generated from secondary emotions. These emotions and 
feelings have been connected, by learning, to predicted future outcomes of certain 
scenarios’’ (Damasio, 1994, p. 174). 
When a negative somatic marker is linked to an image of a future outcome, 
an alarm goes of (Slovic et al., 2007). For a skier this somatic marker could be 
experienced as a “negative feeling of fear”, linked to an image of oneself being 
caught in an avalanche. On the other hand, when a positive marker is associated with 
the outcome image, it can become the green light that says “go”. A “positive marker” 
can, for a skier, be linked to an outcome image of unworried skiing in a safe place. 
The somatic marker hypothesis might therefore be valuable for understanding the 
underlying mechanisms of perceived safety and their influence in decision-making. 
In short, the somatic marker hypothesis proposes that images, marked by 
positive and negative affective feelings, guide judgment and decision-making. By 
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developing this idea further, Slovic et al. (2007) have suggested that people use an 
affect heuristic to make judgments: 
… representations of objects and events in people’s minds are tagged to 
varying degrees with affect. In the process of making a judgment or decision, 
people consult or refer to a ‘‘affect pool’’ containing all the positive and 
negative tags consciously or unconsciously associated with the 
representations. Just as imaginability, memorability, and similarity serve as 
cues for probability, judgments (e.g., the availability and representativeness 
heuristics), affect may serve as a cue for many important judgments (Slovic 
et al., 2007, p. 1335). 
Dual process theories, the somatic marker hypothesis and the affect heuristic 
all point to our feelings playing a central role in decision-making. Perceived Safety 
fits this trend with its emphasis on the subjective feeling of safety. 
Perceived safety and heuristics 
The majority of avalanches catching people are triggered by people 
(Fredston, Fesler, & Tremper, 1994; D. McClung & Schaerer, 2006; Tremper, 2008). 
This striking phenomenon has lead to speculations of avalanche victims tending to 
make critical decisions based on human desires, assumptions and the use of 
heuristics, rather than on the integration of key elements of physical data (Fredston et 
al., 1994; McCammon, 2004). While some avalanche accidents might be the result of 
people not recognizing the potential hazard, most accidents occur according to 
Fredston and colleagues (1994) when the victims either underestimate the hazard or 
overestimate their ability to deal with it. Another suggestion is that people are misled 
by unconscious heuristics, or rules of thumb, that guide most of our decisions in 
everyday life (McCammon, 2004).  
Heuristics. In their seminal study Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics 
and Biases (1974), Tversky and Kahneman demonstrated how boundedly rational 
individuals employ heuristics such as availability, representativeness, and anchoring 
and adjustment to make judgments. Kahneman defines a heuristic as “a simple 
procedure that helps find adequate, though often imperfect, answers to difficult 
questions” (Kahneman, 2011, p. 98). Heuristics, Kahneman suggests, work by the 
process of substitution, that is, when a difficult question cannot be answered quickly, 
we automatically find a related question that is easier to answer (Kahneman, 2011). 
Substituting one question for another can be an adequate strategy when faced with 
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difficult problems if this is a deliberate choice. It becomes problematic when 
heuristics are not chosen, but become a consequence of the “mental shotgun”, the 
imprecise control we have over targeting our responses to questions (Kahneman, 
2011).  
Heuristics are in general both useful and effective but can sometimes lead to 
severe and systematic errors. Avalanches present according to McCammon (2004) a 
unique hazard that renders some of our heuristics irrelevant, and in some cases 
dangerous as they can lead us into what is called a heuristic trap by producing a 
grossly inaccurate perception of a hazard. When considering skiing a slope, the key 
question should be: what is the avalanche danger in this particular slope? When 
faced with the overwhelming amount of uncertainty in avalanche risk assessment, the 
process of substitution would suggest that we answer a simpler question to make the 
decision: does it feel safe? 
In his article Heuristic Traps in Recreational Avalanche Accidents: Evidence 
and Implications, McCammon (2004) examined the existence of heuristics in 
avalanche accidents by reviewing 715 recreational accidents that took place in the 
United States between 1972 and 2003. These investigations lead McCammon to 
suggest the following heuristics to be influential among skiers: familiarity, 
consistency, acceptance, the expert halo, social facilitation and scarcity. 
McCammons findings were later tested by Furman et al. (2010) who found five 
factors influencing the decision to ski a particular slope (McCammons heuristics in 
brackets): (a) that a slope is untracked (scarcity), (b) whether skiers were familiar 
with the slope (familiarity), (c) that there was a leader in the group (the expert halo 
heuristic), (d) that there were other skiing parties present (social facilitation), and (e) 
that the skier was committed to skiing a particular slope (commitment). We argue 
that at least three of the suggested heuristics: familiarity, the expert halo heuristic, 
and social facilitation are the results of perceived safety.  
 The familiarity heuristic. The familiarity heuristic relies on the use of past 
actions to guide behavior in a familiar environment (McCammon, 2004). The 
familiarity heuristic is mostly reliable, but when the hazard changes and the setting 
remains familiar, McCammon points to a potential trap. The positive reward 
associated with skiing a particular slope without negative consequences yields an 
association between the slope and a positive outcome. According to the previously 
mentioned somatic marker hypothesis (Damasio, 1994), this association has 
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influence on future decisions under similar circumstances, that is, feeling safe in a 
familiar place. Familiarity might also be related to habituation, where individuals 
repeat past behavior out of habit (Furman et al., 2010). Support for the familiarity 
heuristic has been provided by McCammon (2004) who found a significant increase 
in exposure scores for all groups in a familiar terrain, and the effect was most 
pronounced in parties with the highest level of training. The familiarity heuristic also 
gets support from Furman et al. (2010) who found familiarity with a slope to be 
positively related to the likelihood of skiing a slope. Perceived safety related to 
familiarity would expand the foundation of the familiarity heuristic. 
The expert halo heuristic. Skiers mostly travel in groups. The need for 
leadership in these groups often produces informal leaders who, for various reasons, 
end up making critical decisions for the party. This leadership can be based on 
knowledge and experience in avalanche terrain. However, sometimes it is simply 
based on being older, a better rider, or more assertive than other group members 
(McCammon, 2004).  
The halo effect is according to Kahneman (2011) “the sense we often get that 
we know and understand a person about whom we actually know very little” (p. 
114). According to McCammon (2004), the expert halo heuristic may influence 
party members to ascribe avalanche skills to a person, that the person may not have. 
With the application of Kahneman`s theory of substitution, the expert halo heuristic 
then may lead group members to substitute the target question of avalanche risk into 
a heuristic based on trust in the leader. Skiing accidents have also been suggested to 
be more likely when a group fails to rely on its own judgment by abandoning 
decision making in general to a leader (McCammon, 2004). This heuristic may also 
be a product of groupthink: that cohesive groups make decisions without critically 
scrutinizing them (Furman et al., 2010). An important prerequisite for the expert halo 
effect might also be perceived safety, i.e. that the expert makes us feel safe.  
The social facilitation heuristic. The social facilitation heuristic is based on 
the assumption that we are more likely to take risks in the presence of others. 
McCammon (2004) operationalized social facilitation as whether or not skiers 
encountered other parties while in the backcountry and found that parties that had 
met others exposed themselves to significantly more hazards than parties who had 
met nobody. This finding is supported by Furman et al. (2010), who found 
encountering other parties was positively related to the likelihood to skiing a slope. 
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An important prerequisite for social facilitation might also be perceived safety, i.e. 
feeling safe amongst other people. 
Animal studies have documented that individuals visually scan for predators 
less frequently when in the safety of larger groups (Bednekoff & Lima, 1998), 
indicating that group size affects how animals perceive safety. Humans are thought 
to be susceptible to the same effect, called “safety in numbers”, i.e., we feel safer in 
large groups. This hypothesis is based on the assumption of being less likely to be 
the victim of an accident when being part of a large group, or in the proximity of 
others. Assuming safety in numbers is dangerous to skiers, as exemplified by 
accidents where entire parties of skiers got caught in the same avalanche. This was 
recently the case in Kåfjord, Northern Norway, where five people in a group of six 
were killed when the entire party was caught in an avalanche in March 2012.  
Whilst heuristic traps and perceived safety might describe the foundation of 
our decisions, risk compensation theory is about how all this might influence our 
behavior. 
Risk compensation theory 
The use of avalanche airbags to prevent burial and avalanche beacons to 
speed up the location of buried avalanche victims have proven to reduce mortality 
significantly (Haegeli et al., 2011). In their study, the relative risk of being killed was 
reduced by 91% by the use of an avalanche airbag. The analysis showed also that in 
20% of avalanche accidents where an airbag was worn, the balloons did not inflate, 
due to technical failure or because the user was unable to activate the airbag by 
pulling the string (Haegeli et al., 2011). The reliability of an avalanche airbag is 
therefore questionable and should not be included as a protective factor in risk 
assessment. A theory that acknowledges this danger is the Risk Compensation 
Theory (Hedlund, 2000) hypothesizing that safety measures can influence our 
behavior, making us use up the additional safety through more risky actions: 
Risk compensation can occur —people are not machines. We all change our 
behavior in response to changes in our environment. Safety measures change 
our environment, so we may change our behavior in response to them. Many 
rational and behavioral factors influence whether and how our behavior will 
change. Never assume that behavior will not change. (Hedlund, 2000, p. 88) 
According to Hedlund (2000) four factors influence risk compensation: 
visibility, effect, motivation, and control. Hedlund helpfully sets out four rules for 
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judging the circumstances in which behavior might or might not change in terms of 
risk compensation. First, ”If I don’t know it’s there, I won’t compensate for a safety 
measure.” An avalanche airbag fails this test. Secondly; “If it doesn’t affect me, I 
won’t compensate for a safety measure.” A confirmation of the item “ I feel safer 
with an avalanche airbag than without” could indicate that it does affect us and that 
compensation is likely to occur. Thirdly: “If I have no reason to change my behavior, 
I won’t compensate for a safety measure.” Many factors could serve as a motivation 
for skiing in avalanche terrain, e.g. powder skiing. Fourthly:” If my behavior is 
tightly controlled, I won’t compensate for a safety measure.” Off-piste and back- 
country skiing are activities with a considerable freedom to compensate.  
Hedlund (2000) also warns against injury prevention measures that promise 
more benefits than they deliver, due to bad science, political pressures, or failure to 
consider risk compensation or system effects. One advertisement for avalanche 
airbags reported a 97% survival rate for those who managed to activate their airbag. 
This unduly optimistic prediction qualifies for a warning.  
 An individual may be both producers and/or consumers of safety (Porzsolt et 
al., 2011). Skiers can try to avoid high-risk terrain and buy safety equipment, but 
external hazard like an avalanche cannot always be controlled. To buy safety thru 
expensive equipment may therefore be an effort to take control over the hazard. 
Locus of control  
How skiers perceive their own ability to avoid danger might also depend on 
how they perceive situational control in avoidance and handling of accidents. The 
concept of locus of control describes a person’s perception of responsibility for the 
events in his or her life (Rotter, 1966). Locus of control thereby refers to whether 
people tend to attribute that responsibility internally, within themselves, or 
externally, to luck, fate, chance or other people. Internal locus of control refers to the 
expectancy that the individual has control over events in the environment. For skiers, 
a reliance on internal factors like knowledge and skills could indicate an internal 
locus of control influencing the perception of safety. A reliance on a guide or 
experienced others could on the other side indicate that the perceived safety is 
influenced by an external locus of control. Other personality traits might influence 
perceived safety as well. 
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Personality traits 
McClung (2002) argued that personality traits influence decision making in 
avalanche terrain and identified risk propensity as such a personality trait. To 
investigate the role of risk propensity Furman et al. (2010) used the Stimulating Risk 
Inventory (SRI) (Zaleskiewicz, 2001) in an effort to account for the influence of the 
participants trait level perception of risk on decision making. The SRI is a ten item, 
trait-based measure of risk-taking tendency aimed at providing indicators of a 
person`s tendency to take risks. The SRI is part of a two dimensional measure known 
as the Stimulation-Instrumental Risk Inventory (SIRI), which was developed to 
measure dual-process decision making (rational and intuitive)(Zaleskiewicz, 2001). 
The SRI scale centers on stimulating risk-taking, e.g. like the risk one might 
encounter while skiing in avalanche terrain. Furman et al. (2010) selected the SRI for 
its foundation in heuristic-based decision making, ease of administration, and 
because it was related to the preference for recreational risks. The SRI is assumed to 
be associated with personality features connected with paratelic orientation, arousal 
seeking, impulsivity, and strong sensation seeking according to Zaleskiewicz (2001). 
Two examples from the SRI are as follows: “I am attracted by different dangerous 
activities.” and “I make risky decisions without an unnecessary waste of time.” 
Furman et al. (2010) found that a measure on risk-taking propensity was positively 
related to the decision to ski a slope, indicating that this factor was important in the 
decision-making process. To explore the relationship between risk taking propensity 
and the perception of safety, we chose to include both dimensions of the SIRI in this 
study. The Instrumental Risk-taking Inventory (IRI) constitutes the second part of the 
Stimulation-Instrumental Risk Inventory (SIRI) (Zaleskiewicz, 2001). IRI is a seven 
item trait-based measure of risk-taking tendency, aimed to provide indicators of 
respondents’ own tendency to take risks to make an achievement.  
A person who takes instrumental risk to reach some future profit strives, 
according to Zaleskiewicz (2001), for “controlling the environment to avoid the 
possibility of engaging in an activity whose outcome depend mainly on chance. 
Consistently, an instrumental decision maker deliberates more the kind of possible 
consequences, analyses the probabilities and concentrates on negative outcomes.” 
Instrumental risk taking is therefore assumed to be more achievement oriented, based 
on a more complex way of information processing and the use of cognitive clues 
(Zaleskiewicz, 2001). Climbing a steep and impressive mountain or skiing a 
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particular slope under moderate avalanche danger certainly demands instrumental 
risk-taking.  
According to dual process theory mentioned earlier, the use of cognitive clues 
might indicate that instrumental risk-taking works by analytical, deliberative, verbal, 
and rational processes (Epstein, 1994). Stimulating risk-taking on the other hand is 
presented as a more rapid, effortless and even automatic behavior (Zaleskiewicz, 
2001) indicating intuitive, automatic, natural and experiential processes (Epstein, 
1994). The possible presence of both forms of risk-taking made us include both IRI 
and SRI in our study. 
Aim 
The aim of this study was to develop an instrument for assessing perceived 
safety among off-piste and backcountry skiers. By means of such an instrument 
human factors in avalanche accidents could hopefully be studied in a more precise 
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Method 
This study consists of three parts: a literature review, focus group interviews 
and an electronic survey. The literature review and the focus groups were both 
conducted with the purpose of item generation for an assessment tool to be used for 
the electronic survey. 
Literature review 
A literature review failed to uncover any existing literature on perceived 
safety among off-piste and backcountry skiers. Different databases were scrutinized 
for relevant literature, i.e. Psych Info, MedLine, ERIC, ISI web of knowledge, the 
local university library, historical articles and books. Examples of search terms were 
“safety in skiing, perceived safety off-piste, avalanche safety, avalanche risk, skiing 
risk, perceived safety, backcountry skiing, dangers in skiing, natural hazards and 
safety, recreational activity and safety.” The researcher obtained an overview of the 
problem by the literature review and participation in the National Avalanche 
Conference held in Tromsø in November 2011. 
Focus groups 
A focus group brings together a small group of participants to discuss a topic 
of interest. Focus groups provide a different perspective on the research problem 
compared to individual interviews (Palys, 2003). By using focus groups, the goal is 
to uncover factors relating to complex behavior or motivations and to generate an 
understanding of complicated topics (Krueger, 1994). Focus groups also provide 
insights into the attitudes, perceptions and opinions of the participants (Adams, 
2005).  
Focus groups are particularly useful for exploratory research, where 
preliminary findings can be presented to the focus group for further consideration 
and discussion (Palys, 2003). In this way, opinions and themes derived from 
individual surveys or case studies are placed on the table for discussion and 
extensive group interaction (Adams, 2005).  
Participants. Participants for the focus groups were recruited by snowball 
sampling and were all experienced skiers living in Tromsø in the North of Norway. 
An inquiry was sent to the participants (N=12) by email during December 2011 for 
the focus group meetings to be held in January 2012. Information about the study 
was given both orally and in writing, and all participants signed a consent form 
declaring their voluntary participation. The form also highlighted their right to leave 
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the focus group at any time and informed the participants that the interview would be 
tape-recorded for further analysis. Recording also made it possible for the researcher 
to focus on the moderation and observation of the discussion without getting 
distracted by taking notes. There were three focus groups consisting of 3, 4 and 5 
participants, respectively. All interviews were held in comfortable chairs in a round 
table setting with coffee and cakes at the Department of Psychology at the University 
of Tromsø, Norway.  
Procedure. Three focus groups with a total of 12 skiers were held to identify 
main topics for item generation. The focus groups lasted between two and two and 
half hours, depending on the talkativeness of the participants. An interview guide had 
been prepared in advance to provide the moderator with guidelines when conducting 
the focus group. In order to create this guide the researcher had reviewed the 
scientific literature, had several discussions with avalanche safety specialists and 
participated in the National Avalanche Conference held in Tromsø November 2011. 
These sources were used to generate ideas and reflections on where to look for areas 
of interest concerning perceived safety.  
Electronic survey 
Participants. The survey respondents lived all over Norway, as shown by 
their postal codes. The largest group lived in northern Norway (Nordland and Troms 
county). The mean age of responders was 32 years (SD = 8.81). Only 25% of the 
responders were female (N=418). The proportion of respondents with own children 
was 31,6%. The sample was highly educated in avalanche safety (Figure 2, 
Appendix -B). The sample was also very well academically educated compared to 
the general population, with 75% of the respondents having completed 3 years or 
more of higher education (university/ college) compared to 27,8% in the general 
Norwegian population (SSB, 2010). In more detail, 41% had completed more than 4 
years of studies on a higher educational level (university/ college), 34% had 
completed up to and including 3 years of tertiary education, 23 % had completed 
high school, and 1% secondary school. The samples means of travel are described in 
figure 4 (Appendix – B). More than 71% knew someone who had been caught by an 
avalanche and 17,5% confirmed that they had been caught themselves. 40,5% had 
triggered an avalanche and 73,5% had observed an avalanche being triggered. 
Equipment usage in the sample population is described in Figure 3, Appendix –B. As 
concerns avalanche forecasts, 52,4% confirmed that there is an avalanche forecast 
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available in the area they ski the most. Only a couple of weeks prior to the survey 
was released, a beta version of regional avalanche forecasts was made available by a 
state authority on the internet at varsom.no, covering most of the high-traffic areas in 
Norway. Since this service was brand-new, it is unlikely that all responders knew if 
there was an avalanche forecast covering their area.  
Procedure. After completing the focus group interviews, the recordings were 
reviewed and aspects concerning safety extracted. The important safety-related 
issues were then phrased into 127 items. Due to redundancy and irrelevance the 
number of items was reduced to 54 items before being compiled into the scale. 
Forty-one items on background information like demographics, experience, 
equipment and a rating of feared events were included, as well (see Appendix). In 
addition, the survey contained our Norwegian version of the 17 item Stimulating- 
Instrumental Risk Inventory (Zaleskiewicz, 2001).  
The validity and logic of the scale was tested with the help of experienced 
skiers. Changes to the items were made accordingly, and the survey was finalized for 
distribution with a total of 127 items (see Appendix C).  
The electronic survey was distributed and data collected by means of the 
online survey tool Questback. A link to this survey was distributed by email, Internet 
sites like friflyt.no, utemagasinet.no, snoskred.no, snøskredvarsel.no, and by 
facebook.com. Together with the link for the survey a short general presentation of 
the study was enclosed. The participants could win an avalanche airbag. 
Statements concerning perceived safety and SIRI were answered by ticking 
one alternative on a five-point Likert scale ranging from “totally disagree” to “totally 
agree”. To complete the survey, no answers could be skipped yielding an extremely 
low amount of missing items. 
Statistics. To decide if factor analysis was possible with the sample at hand, 
general guidelines were considered. A common rule recommends at least 10-15 
participants per item to ensure reliability in factor analysis (Field, 2009). Costello & 
Osborne (2005) found that only 18,4% in a sample of published factor analysis had a 
subject to item ratio of >20:1. With N=1663 and 54 variables, our measure of 
perceived safety gave an item/subject ratio of 30:1. Our ratio should therefore be in 
the range for a “large-sample” procedure like EFA, where generalizable or replicable 
results are unlikely if the sample is too small (Costello & Osborne, 2005).  
PERCEIVED SAFETY AMONG OFF-PISTE & BACKCOUNTRY SKIERS  
	  
22	  
A principal component analysis with Varimax rotation and Kaiser 
Normalization was conducted. The inter-item correlation was inspected by visually 
scanning the correlation matrix to check for redundant items. A parallel analysis was 
conducted to assist factor extraction. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of normal 
distribution was used to see if the variables were normally distributed. Spearman’s 
correlation coefficients were calculated to test relationships between variables and 
Cronbach alpha (α) to check the internal consistency.  
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Results 
Sampling 
More than 1100 responses were collected during the first 24 hours. After 
another two weeks a total of 1715 responses had been returned. Due to missing items 
and error 14 responses had to be discarded. Since the instrument was aimed at an 
adult population, all respondents under the age of 18 years were removed. This left 
us with a sample of N=1663. 
Analysis 
A Principal Component Factor Analysis (PCA) of all items (N=54) with an 
orthogonal (Varimax) rotation to simplify structure was conducted using SPSS 
(Version 19). A Varimax rotation was chosen based on a visual inspection of the 
correlation matrix, showing low correlations, indicating that the components was not 
related. The sampling adequacy was verified by a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure, 
KMO= .88 (“great” according to Field (2009)), and all KMO values for individual 
items were >.662, which is well above the accepted limit of .5 (Field, 2009) 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity χ2 (1431) = 22370.934, p< .001 indicated that correlations 
between items were significantly strong for PCA. The number of factors to retain for 
further analysis was determined by inspection of the scree plot (Figure 1. Appendix- 
A). An inspection indicated an “elbow” at both five and nine factors. A parallel 
analysis supported the use of eight or fewer factors and cumulative percentage of 
explained variance indicated that if eight factors were extracted these would explain 
44,0% of the variance. In comparison, extracting five factors only would explain 
33,9% of the variance.  
PCA was conducted with the limitations of 5 and 8 factors. Due to low α, 
many cross-loadings and limited real life logic and relevance on several of the 
factors in the fixed 8 factor rotation, a limitation of 5 factors was chosen. Items 
loading <.40 were excluded, and a new PCA was run on the remaining items. 
Negatively correlating factors were reversed to fit the content of the factors and 
resulted in improved Cronbach α coefficients. Due to a very low α-level and no real 
life logic or relevance another item was removed, requiring a new PCA. The factor 
loadings of the final factor analysis are presented in table 1 (Appendix A). This last 
analysis provided a Kaiser-Maier-Olkin criterion, KMO= .880 (“great” according to 
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Field (2009)), and Bartlett’s test of sphericity χ2 (630) =15567.617, p< .001. The 
cumulative variance explained in the final five-factor model totalled to 42,3%. 
The five factors identified in the final analysis were: Perceived Exposure, 
Collective Safety, Safe Objects, Knowledge & Skills and Experience (Table 1. 
Appendix-A). This factor structure yielded a scale consisting of 35 items in total. 
Factor 1. Perceived Exposure emerged as the strongest factor explaining 
18,5% of the variance and a Cronbach α .77 (seven items). Following are some 
sample items from this factor, and the percentage of respondents who agreed or 
strongly agreed to the items: “I feel safer in slopes that I know are frequently skied” 
(58,8%), “I experience frequently skied mountains as safer” (56,3%), “Riding in the 
forest feels safer than riding in open mountain sides” (82,7%).  
Factor 2. Collective Safety accounted for 8,7% of the variance with a 
Cronbach α .78 (6 items). The following are some sample items from this factor, and 
the percentage of respondents who agreed or strongly agreed to the items: “I feel 
safer when we are many hiking together” (75,2%), “Traveling collectively as a group 
feels safer” (68,1%), “I feel safer when hiking if there are others nearby” (64%).  
Factor 3. Safe Objects accounted for 6,4% of the variance with a Cronbach α 
.71 (8 items). Following are some sample items from this factor, and the percentage 
of respondents who agreed or strongly agreed to the item: “I feel safer with an 
avalanche beacon than without” (86,1%), “Leaving my avalanche beacon can make 
me feel unsafe” (82,5%), “I feel safer carrying a shovel and a probe than without” 
(74,2%), “I feel safer with others I know have a lot of knowledge about avalanches” 
(95,6%), “I would have felt safer carrying an avalanche airbag” (78,6%), “I feel safer 
riding with a helmet than without” (85,9%), “I feel safer skiing or snowboarding 
with someone with more experience than myself” (73,4%), “When I follow someone 
I trust, I feel safe” (64,6%).  
Factor 4. Knowledge & Skills accounted for 4% of the variance with a 
Cronbach α .69 (7 items). Following are some sample items from this factor, and the 
percentage of respondents who agreed or strongly agreed to the item: “I can use my 
safety equipment efficiently” (79,9%), “Increased knowledge has made me feel safer 
in terms of avalanche danger” (73,0%), “Weather history and knowledge about the 
snow conditions are vital for me to be able to feel safe” (87,5%), “Keeping distance 
to others increase security” (89,1%).  
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Factor 5. Experience accounted for 4,7% of the variance with a Cronbach α 
.66 (seven items). Following are some sample items from this factor, and the 
percentage of respondents who agreed or strongly agreed to the item: “I can feel 
unsafe in places I know there have been avalanches before” (87,8%), “Changes in 
weather and snow conditions can make me feel unsafe” (91,0%), “I more often feel 
unsafe in unknown terrain” (80,4%), “Observing that an avalanche has been 
triggered can make me feel unsafe” (73,8%), “I feel unsafe more easily when there is 
plenty of snow” (53,4%) “Increased knowledge and experience has made me more 
cautious regarding avalanches (86,8%), “I more easily feel unsafe when I have 
responsibility for others” (60,4%).  
Correlations. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov normal distribution test showed a 
significance level of .000 for all factor scores, suggesting a violation of the 
assumption of normality and the use of a nonparametric test of correlation. Because 
the Likert scale produced ordinal variables, Spearman’s correlation coefficient was 
used. The relationship between the different factors and various items can be seen in 
table 2 (Appendix - A).  
There was a strong positive correlation between Perceived Exposure and 
Collective Safety (rho=.453, p<.01), Collective Safety and Safe Objects (rho=.500, 
p<.01) and SRT and IRT (rho=.412, p<.01). Amount of Avalanche Education 
correlated moderately to Perceived Exposure (rho=-.320, p<.01), Collective Safety 
(rho=-.343, p<.01), Experience (rho=.338, p<.01) and Number of backcountry trips 
per season (rho=.387, p<.01). Weak but significant correlations were also found 
between Age and Perceived Exposure (rho=-.139, p<.01), Collective Safety (rho=-
.103, p<.01), Safe Objects (rho=-.210, p<.01) and Knowledge & Skills (rho=.100, 
p<.01). The trait measures of risk propensity SRT and IRT, and the factors of 
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Discussion 
The aim of this study was to develop an instrument for assessment and 
exploration of perceived safety among off-piste and backcountry skiers.  
All statements in our survey can be seen as heuristics concerning perceived 
safety. The high level of agreement indicates that these heuristics represent important 
aspects for perceived safety among skiers.  
By factor analysis, five factors were identified representing the main items 
determining the perceived safety of off-piste and backcountry skiers. These factors 
were Perceived Exposure, Collective Safety, Safe Objects, Knowledge & Skills and 
Experience. These factors explain a notable proportion of the total variance, 
suggesting them as key factors in the forthcoming discussion and investigation of 
perceived safety. Instead of suggesting these factors as new heuristics in the debate 
about heuristic traps, it can be argued that all of them are under the influence of one 
single factor: perceived safety.  
Perceived Exposure 
Items clustering in factor 1 all described situations and places that can be 
seen as more or less exposed to avalanche danger. Perceived exposure is an 
important factor concerning safety and an obvious prerequisite for feeling safe. One 
of the items in the factor Perceived Exposure is “I feel safer in slopes I know get 
skied frequently”. The idea that frequently skied slopes are safer is widespread and 
based on the fact that frequent skiing contributes to a stabilization of the snowpack. 
But frequent skiing makes no guarantee against avalanches, since weather conditions 
may change and previous skiers might not have loaded the slope sufficiently to 
trigger an avalanche (Landrø, 2002). To perceive frequently skied slopes as safe may 
therefore be a heuristic trap. This is also the case with experiencing frequently skied 
mountains as safer. As mentioned earlier, avalanches can occur in every snow-
covered slope that is steep enough.  
Respondents did not report feeling safer when skiing off-piste or in the 
proximity of a ski lift compared to backcountry. However, discussions in the focus 
groups suggested that this might be the case. Few of the experienced skiers admitted 
to take the same safety precautions when skiing off-piste compared to backcountry, 
pointing to a lack of time and opportunity to do personal evaluations of the avalanche 
danger when transported by a ski lift. If skiers are comfortable with fewer safety 
precautions when riding off-piste, this could indicate a higher degree of perceived 
PERCEIVED SAFETY AMONG OFF-PISTE & BACKCOUNTRY SKIERS  
	  
28	  
safety. Few Norwegian ski lifts offer avalanche forecasts to their visitors, only 
general warnings. While an avalanche forecast has the potential to guide behavior 
thru its influence on perceived safety, general warnings tend to be ignored. 
The majority also felt safer riding in the forest than in open mountainsides. 
While a high density of trees may have a stabilizing effect on the snow-pack and 
hamper avalanches, scattered trees on open slopes represent no protection against 
avalanches (D. McClung & Schaerer, 2006). Since only scattered forest is suitable 
for skiing, perceived safety while skiing in the forest also makes a potential heuristic 
trap. Perceived exposure therefore seems as an important part of perceived safety as 
acknowledged by these heuristics.  
With the use of decision-making tools, heuristic traps can be replaced with 
sound heuristics, making perceived safety more in line with objective safety. But as 
the ongoing debate about the quality of some current tools indicates, faulty decision-
making tools can also create a false sense of security (Uttl, Kisinger, Kibreab, & Uttl, 
2009; Uttl et al., 2010). 
Collective Safety  
Items clustering in factor 3 described perceived safety as part of a group or in 
the proximity of others, and can be exemplified with the item “I feel safer when we 
are many hiking together“. The survey respondents agreed moderately to this item, 
indicating its importance for perceived safety. 
Animal studies have documented that individuals visually scan for predators 
less frequently when in the safety of larger groups (Bednekoff & Lima, 1998), 
indicating that group size affects how animals perceive safety. That skiers feel safer 
hiking many together could indicate that this effect also affects humans. 
We also suggest that perceived safety might be an important prerequisite for 
the social facilitation heuristic mentioned previously. Perceived safety as a result of 
group size puts the skier at risk of heuristic traps, but also to group dynamics like 
conformity. Collective Safety showed a negative correlation with age, the amount of 
avalanche education and the number of backcountry trips per season. This finding is 
in accordance with the observation from the focus group interviews that older, more 
educated and experienced skiers avoid large groups due to safety measures because 
of their susceptibility of group dynamics.  




The Safe Objects factor-clustered statements on perceived safety related to 
safety equipment and towards trusted people. “I feel safer with an avalanche beacon 
than without” concerns perceived safety related to the use of safety equipment. 
Avalanche beacons have been proven to increase the probability of survival by 
approximately 50% thru a reduction of burial time (Landrø, 2002). But reduced 
burial time is apparently not enough, mechanical injuries and suffocation kill people, 
no matter how well equipped they are. Perceived safety related to equipment is 
therefore questionable, both concerning its contribution to the affect heuristic and in 
terms of risk compensation. Several focus group participants expressed their fear of 
risk compensation, especially with the use of avalanche airbags. The following 
suggestion even emerged from the discussion: to test out if your safety equipment 
affects your decisions, ask yourself: would I have skied this slope without? 
 The majority of the respondents reported using safety equipment like helmet, 
shovels, probe and avalanche beacons (Appendix B, Figure 3). The widespread use 
of safety equipment confirms the importance of safety in this group.  
 “I feel safer together with someone I know has a lot of knowledge of 
avalanches” measures perceived safety in a relation between two people. Following 
someone you trust is usually a good advice, but can also makes ground for the halo 
heuristic previously mentioned. Safe Objects therefore seems as an important aspect 
of perceived safety, with the potential to influence skiers` decisions in face of 
avalanche danger. 
Knowledge & Skills 
Factor number 4 clustered items of perceived safety related to the 
respondents` knowledge and skills and can be exemplified with the item: “I feel 
confident on my own ability to assess avalanche danger. ” Knowledge & Skills had 
the only significant positive correlation to age, suggesting that older respondents 
perceive safety more in terms of their own knowledge and skills. In comparison, age 
showed a weak negative correlation with Perceived Exposure, Collective Safety and 
Safe Objects indicating a reduction of perceived safety regarding these factors with 
age. This could be a result of greater internal locus of control in older respondents 
making them trust their own skills and evaluations more than external factors beyond 
their control. A high level of perceived internal control in the face of uncontrollable 
elements like avalanche danger may constitute a risk by itself.  
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 Amount of avalanche education and Knowledge & Skills showed only a 
weak positive correlation that might be due to the fact that the sample in general was 
relatively well educated concerning avalanche safety (see appendix B, figure 2.).  
Experience 
Experience represents a factor of statements concerning perceived safety 
related to personal experience. The survey respondents agreed or strongly agreed to 
several of these items, indicating them as relevant for the perceived safety. One 
example from this factor is “I more often feel unsafe in unknown terrain”. The high 
level of agreement on this last statement supports perceived safety as an important 
basis for the familiarity heuristic previously mentioned. Interestingly, the factor 
Experience did not correlate with age. A possible explanation of this finding could be 
that the Experience factor measures recent episodes more than general life 
experience, making it susceptible for the availability heuristic which according to 
Kahneman (2011) is the process of judging frequency by the ease with which an 
instance comes to mind.  
Personality traits 
Safety and security are according to Porzsolt et al. (2011) influenced by states 
like situations and by traits such as persistent factors related to personality. 
Intentionality to increase risk is therefore an interesting trait in terms of risk 
compensation theory and perceived safety. A normal distribution on both the SRT 
(Stimulating Risk Taking) and IRT (Instrumental Risk Taking) scores indicate that 
our population did not stand out as significantly risk- averse or risk seeking. Weak 
correlations between the trait measures of risk propensity and the factors of 
perceived safety are further underlining this finding. 
Limitations 
The limited amount of literature on the topic was a challenge in the 
development of this instrument. Findings from this study should be viewed with 
consideration of the limitations implicit of self-report data obtained from surveys. 
This study was also conducted during a limited period of time and thru a selection of 
channels on the Internet, compromising the generalizability of the instrument to 
some degree. When using Principal Component Analysis, the conclusions are 
restricted to the sample collected (Field, 2009). Further testing is necessary, but the 
current scale gives an indication of areas of concern. 
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Cross-validation of the factor analysis was in this study only done by visual 
inspection due to limited time. A further development of the scale will therefore have 
to include a cross-validation and a Confirmatory Factor Analysis.  
Some respondents commented that they disagreed on items they found 
imprecise in their wording. This could indicate that some respondents perceived the 
scale as a “test of knowledge”, with right and wrong answers, and failed to 
acknowledge perceived safety as the target. This misunderstanding might have led 
some respondents to disagree more frequently, but this seems not to have affected the 
response-pattern notably.  
Further studies 
Further studies should focus on other contributing factors to perceived safety 
like motivation, personality, locus of control, group processes and physiological 
aspects like the effect of hormones. The role of perceived safety in decision-making 
could also be experimentally tested in a scenario inspired by Furman et al. (2010). 
The relationship between perceived safety and quantified risk could be explored by 
measuring perceived safety related to the different levels of danger on the avalanche 
scale. The influence of unconscious thoughts in decision-making among skiers 
should also be of interest. From a perceived safety perspective, all measures that 
contribute to bring perceived safety more in line with the objective safety seem 
valuable for accident prevention.  
Conclusion 
This study is intended as a contribution to the understanding of human factors 
in avalanche accidents by exploring skiers own perspective on safety. Our findings 
support perceived safety as central in skiers decision-making.  
The author of this thesis argues that perceived safety is driven by the 
underlying mechanisms of cognition and affect. This claim is supported by dual 
process theory and the heuristics of perceived safety revealed in this work. Perceived 
safety related to these numerous heuristic traps has the potential of guiding our 
decisions towards increased risk taking, in line with risk-compensation theory. The 
process of substitution suggests that we substitute the major questions with minor 
ones. We argue that substitution works not only by reducing complexity, but also by 
shifting our focus towards questions we perceive more relevant to one of the most 
critical aspects of our living: safety.  
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As a novel and interesting perspective on human factors in avalanche 
accidents, we hope this study will generate more research on the topic and be of 
practical use to skiers and avalanche educators in the prevention of future accidents. 
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Figure 1: Scree plot 
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Table 3. A translation of the final items. 
Item number Item content 
Factor 1: Perceived Exposure 
30.  I feel safer in slopes I know get skied frequently. 
29.  I am less scared of getting caught by an avalanche when skiing off-piste  
than in backcountry skiing. 
39.  I feel safer where there are tracks already. 
24.  I see frequently traveled mountains as safer. 
16.  I feel safer when I am in the proximity of a ski-lift. 
32.  Riding in a forest feels safer than on an open mountainside.  
26.  I feel safer when there is less snow. 
Factor 2: Collective safety 
43.  I feel safer in a big group than in a small group. 
52.  I feel safer in a small group than in a big group. 
8.  Traveling collectively as a group feels safer. 
25.  I feel safer when we are many hiking together. 
17.  I feel safer when hiking if there are others nearby. 
10.  When I am hiking with others who are familiar with the area it seems safer. 
Factor 3: Safe objects 
23.  I feel safer with an avalanche beacon than without. 
54.  Leaving my avalanche beacon at home can make me feel unsafe. 
14.  I feel safer with a shovel and a probe than without. 
11.  I feel safer together with others who I know have a lot of knowledge about  
avalanches. 
35.  I would feel safer if I carried an avalanche airbag. 
7.  I feel safer when riding with a helmet than without. 
28.  I feel safer when riding with someone more experienced than myself. 
12.  When I follow someone I trust, I feel safe. 
Factor 4: Knowledge & skills 
3.  I trust my own ability to assess avalanche risk. 
4.  My skiing/ snowboarding skills make me safer in steep terrain. 
2. I can use my safety equipment effectively. 
5. Increased knowledge has made me feel safer regarding avalanches. 
34.  Weather history and knowledge about snow conditions are vital for me  
to feel safe. 
18.  Leaving the avalanche danger assessment to others can feel safe. 
36.  Keeping distance to the others increase the overall safety. 
Factor 5: Experience 
38.  I can feel unsafe in places I know there have been avalanches before. 
40.  Changes in weather and snow conditions can make me feel unsafe. 
37.  I more often feel unsafe in unknown terrain. 
15.  Observing previously triggered avalanches can make me feel unsafe. 
47.  I feel unsafe more easily when there is plenty of snow.   
27.  Increased knowledge and experience have made me more cautious 
regarding avalanches. 
50.        Having responsibility for others makes me more easily feel unsafe.   
Note: Authors translation 
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Figure 4: Travel means in the study population (N=1663) 
 
Note: Nordic country = fjellski. Respondents using multiple types of equipment 
could tick of several, for example Snowboard + Backcountry Nordic. 
 
 








Appendix - B 




Figure 7. Mean rating of dangers in the sample population (N=1663) 
 
Note: “Please rate how scared you are for the following dangers on a scale from 1-
10, where 1 is minimally scared and 10 maximally scared.” The high rating of 
Avalanche accidents could be a result of priming. The item “Utglidning” was 
removed due to a lack of real life logic.  
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Under følger en del spørsmål om din opplevelse av trygghet og sikkerhet 
når du ferdes på ski eller brett utenfor løypene fra et skitrekk eller på 
topptur. 
 
Din anonymitet vil bli ivaretatt og du kan når som helst avbryte 































1. Det er viktig for meg at jeg føler meg trygg når jeg er ute på ski/ snøbrett. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Jeg kan benytte meg effektivt av alt sikkerhetsutstyret mitt.  1 2 3 4 5 
3. Jeg er trygg på min egen evne til å vurdere snøskredfare. 1 2 3 4 5 
4. Mine ski/snøbrettferdigheter gjør meg tryggere i bratt terreng.  1 2 3 4 5 
5. Økt kunnskap har gjort at jeg føler meg tryggere i forhold til snøskred. 1 2 3 4 5 
6. Opplevelser med snøskred har gjort meg utrygg i tiden etterpå. 1 2 3 4 5 
7. Jeg føler meg tryggere når jeg kjører med hjelm enn uten. 1 2 3 4 5 
8. Å ferdes som en samlet gruppe oppleves tryggere. 1 2 3 4 5 
9. Jeg føler meg sikrere når jeg kjører nedover enn når jeg går oppover. 1 2 3 4 5 
10. Jeg opplever det som tryggere når jeg er sammen med folk som er kjent i 
området. 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. Jeg føler meg tryggere når jeg er sammen med andre som jeg vet kan mye 
om snøskred. 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. Når jeg går etter noen jeg stoler på, føler jeg meg trygg. 1 2 3 4 5 
13. Å ta skredkurs har gjort meg mindre redd for snøskred.  1 2 3 4 5 
14. Jeg føler meg tryggere med spade og søkestang enn uten.  1 2 3 4 5 
15. Å se at det har gått snøskred kan gjøre at jeg føler meg utrygg. 1 2 3 4 5 
16. Jeg føler meg tryggere i nærheten av et skitrekk. 1 2 3 4 5 
17. Jeg føler meg tryggere på tur når det er andre folk i nærheten. 1 2 3 4 5 
18. Det kan kjennes trygt å overlate skredfarevurderingen til andre. 1 2 3 4 5 




19. Jeg føler meg tryggere på fjell som jeg kjenner. 1 2 3 4 5 
20. Dårlig sikt kan gjøre meg uttrygg. 1 2 3 4 5 
21. Jeg føler meg tryggere når jeg står på ski/ brett sammen med noen som er 
eldre enn meg. 
1 2 3 4 5 
22. Å se snøskred på film kan gjøre at jeg føler meg utrygg. 1 2 3 4 5 
23. Jeg føler meg tryggere med skredsøker enn uten. 1 2 3 4 5 
24. Fjell som mange pleier å gå på opplever jeg som tryggere.  1 2 3 4 5 
25. Jeg føler meg tryggere når vi er flere på tur. 1 2 3 4 5 
26. Jeg føler meg tryggere når det er lite snø. 1 2 3 4 5 
27. Økt kunnskap og erfaring har gjort meg mer forsiktig i forhold til snøskred.  1 2 3 4 5 
28. Jeg føler meg tryggere når jeg står på ski/ brett sammen med noen som har 
mer erfaring enn meg 
1 2 3 4 5 
29. Jeg er mindre redd for å bli tatt av skred når jeg kjører utenfor løypene i et 
skitrekk enn når jeg er på topptur. 
1 2 3 4 5 
30. Jeg føler meg tryggere i heng som jeg vet at blir kjørt ofte. 1 2 3 4 5 
31. På steder med snøskredvarsel føler jeg meg tryggere. 1 2 3 4 5 
32. Skogskjøring kjennes tryggere enn kjøring i åpne fjellsider. 1 2 3 4 5 
33. Jeg føler meg tryggest når jeg kan basere meg på andres vurderinger av 
snøskredfaren. 
1 2 3 4 5 
34. Værhistorikk og kjennskap til snøforholdene er avgjørende for at jeg skal 
kunne føle meg trygg. 
1 2 3 4 5 
35. Jeg ville følt meg tryggere med en skredballongsekk på ryggen. 1 2 3 4 5 
36. Å holde avstand til de andre øker sikkerheten. 1 2 3 4 5 
37. Jeg føler meg lettere utrygg i ukjent terreng. 1 2 3 4 5 
38. Jeg kan føle meg uttrygg på steder der jeg vet at det har gått snøskred før. 1 2 3 4 5 
39. Jeg føler meg tryggere der det er spor fra før av.  1 2 3 4 5 
40. Endringer i vær og føreforhold kan gjøre meg utrygg.  1 2 3 4 5 
41. Jeg føler meg tryggere hvis jeg kan bevege meg raskt igjennom terrenget. 1 2 3 4 5 
42. Jeg opplever noen fjell som tryggere enn andre når det gjelder snøskred. 1 2 3 4 5 
43. Jeg føler meg tryggere i en stor gruppe enn i en liten gruppe. 1 2 3 4 5 
44. Jeg kan føle meg utrygg hvis andre i gruppen har mer sikkerhetsutstyr enn 
meg. 
1 2 3 4 5 
45. Jeg føler meg tryggere på våren når det ikke lenger er lagdelt vintersnø. 1 2 3 4 5 
46. Grundig turplanlegging er avgjørende for at jeg skal kunne føle meg trygg. 1 2 3 4 5 
47. Når det er mye snø så blir jeg lettere uttrygg. 1 2 3 4 5 




48. Jeg føler meg tryggere når jeg har tilgang på et skredvarsel for området jeg 
skal kjøre i. 
1 2 3 4 5 
49. Jeg føler meg lettere utrygg når jeg har ansvar for andre. 1 2 3 4 5 
50. Jeg frykter at sikkerhetsutstyr som en skredballongsekk kan få meg til å 
utsette meg for større risiko. 
1 2 3 4 5 
51. Jeg føler meg tryggere når jeg er sammen med folk som jeg vet har samme 
risikoaksept som meg selv. 
1 2 3 4 5 
52. Jeg føler meg tryggere i en liten gruppe enn i en stor gruppe. 1 2 3 4 5 
 Hvis jeg ikke er helt i form så kan jeg lettere  føle meg usikker.      








































1. Hvis jeg spiller et spill (f.eks kort) foretrekker jeg å spille om penger. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Jeg liker å ta risiko (risk taking) 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Jeg tar ofte risiko bare for morro skyld. 1 2 3 4 5 
4. Jeg tar sjanser kun hvis det er absolutt nødvendig for å oppnå et viktig mål. 1 2 3 4 5 
5. Jeg tiltrekkes av ulike farlige aktiviteter. 1 2 3 4 5 
6. Når jeg tar en risiko får jeg en behagelig kriblende følelse 1 2 3 4 5 
7. Jeg unngår aktiviteter der tilfeldigheter i for stor grad bestemmer utfallet. 1 2 3 4 5 
8. Jeg synes pengespill virker veldig spennende. 1 2 3 4 5 
9. I forretninger bør man kun ta risiko hvis situasjonen kan kontrolleres. 1 2 3 4 5 
10. Jeg tar risikofylte avgjørelser raskt og uten å kaste bort unødvendig med tid. 1 2 3 4 5 
11. Jeg foretrekker en jobb med høy lønn som jeg lett kan miste fremfor en fast 
jobb men med lavere lønn. 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. For å oppnå noe i livet må man ta risiko. 1 2 3 4 5 
13. Hvis det er en stor sjanse for profitt tar jeg til og med en veldig høy risiko. 1 2 3 4 5 
14. For å få stort utbytte i næringslivet må man ta en høy risiko. 1 2 3 4 5 
15. Hvis det var en stor sannsynlighet for å mangedoble kapitalen ville jeg til og 
med investert pengene mine i aksjene til et fullstendig nytt og usikkert firma. 
1 2 3 4 5 
16. Jeg foretrekker en jobb med høy lønn som jeg lett kan miste fremfor en fast 
jobb men med lavere lønn. 
1 2 3 4 5 
17. For å oppnå noe i livet må man ta risiko. 1 2 3 4 5 
Note: 1-10: SRT, 11-17: IRT 
 
 




Vennligst oppgi hvor redd du er for følgende farer på en skala fra 1-10 der 1 er minimalt redd og 10 maksimalt 
redd: 
Flyulykke 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Hjerte og 
karsykdommer 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Hypotermi 
(nedkjøling) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Snøskredulykke 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Å bli utsatt for 
vold 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Fall 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Å få kreft 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Utglidning 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Bilulykke 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 





Har du egne barn?  
Hva er ditt postnummer?  
 
 
Hva står du på? (kryss av): 





Noen spørsmål: Ja Nei 
Har du blitt tatt av et snøskred?   
Kjenner du noen som har blitt tatt av 
snøskred? 
  
Har du selv utløst et snøskred?   
Har du observert et snøskred når det 
gikk? 
  
Er det skredvarsling der du kjører mest på 
ski? 
  








Hvor mye utdannelse/ kurs har du når det gjelder snøskred: (kryss av) 
Ingen  
1 dag  
<3 dager  
>3 dager  
 































Bruker du følgende utstyr (kryss av): 
Spade og søkestang  
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